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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 18-1155
_______________
HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS, LLC
v.
ROBERT MICHAEL VOLRATH,
Appellant
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No: 2:17-cv-05323-KSH-CLW)
District Judge: Honorable Katherine S. Hayden
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on November 16, 2018
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: February 1, 2019)
_______________
OPINION*
______________

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent.
*

BIBAS, Circuit Judge.
Breaking contracts has consequences. Michael Volrath signed a contract with his former employer that contained confidentiality and non-solicitation clauses. He has repeatedly
breached those clauses.
The District Court enjoined further breaches. It found that his former employer will
likely succeed on the merits and would otherwise suffer irreparable harm. Given Volrath’s
repeated breaches, the Court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. And the Court applied
the correct post-employment conditions and legal standards. So it did not abuse its discretion. We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Heartland Payment Systems provides credit- and debit-card payment equipment and
services. Heartland makes money by enrolling merchants and charging a fee for each payment it processes for them. And its employees take home a share of its profits in commissions even after they leave Heartland.
Volrath worked at Heartland for ten years. He solicited merchants and learned much
confidential information. During his job, he signed two types of agreements restricting
what he could do after leaving his job. When he left Heartland, he breached some of those
post-employment conditions.
A. Manager agreement
As he rose through the ranks, Volrath signed a manager agreement that laid out various
conditions of his job. It also restricted what he could do after he left Heartland. Two postemployment conditions are at issue.
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First, the manager agreement has a confidentiality clause. When Volrath left the
company, he had to return Heartland’s confidential information or destroy it. And he could
not use or disclose it to anyone.
Second, the agreement has a non-solicitation clause. When Volrath left, he could not
poach Heartland’s merchants or employees. The clause broadly governs all of Heartland’s
merchants: it forbids soliciting “any [Heartland] Merchant or other party having a
contractual or business relationship with [Heartland]” for one year. App. 32 ¶ 9(a). The
clause also has a narrower five-year ban on soliciting those merchants that Volrath signed.
The non-solicitation clause bans soliciting or recruiting Heartland’s employees for two
years as well.
B. Commission agreements
While working at Heartland, Volrath also signed at least twenty-two commission agreements—all of which he signed after the manager agreement. These agreements let employees sell their rights to future commission payments in exchange for a lump-sum payment.
Each commission agreement also contains a non-solicitation clause equal in scope to
the narrow ban in the manager agreement: for several years, Volrath may not solicit Heartland’s merchants that he signed. True, the clause did change once over the years, and the
earlier version applied to “any merchant having a Merchant Agreement with [Heartland].”
App. 99 ¶ 4. And this clause could be read more broadly to bar soliciting any of Heartland’s
merchants. But Volrath concedes that the merchants at issue in the earlier version are only
those that he signed. Appellant’s Br. 8 & n.2. And the language he quotes that purportedly
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broadens this reach is found only in the manager agreement, not the commission agreements. The old and new versions of the commission agreement are thus identical in scope.
So the commission agreements are narrower than the manager agreement. They do not
ban soliciting all Heartland merchants. Nor do they ban soliciting Heartland employees.
And unlike the manager agreement’s strict limits on using all confidential information, the
commission agreements’ confidentiality clause reaches only the terms of the agreements.
Both the commission agreements and management agreement also contain a boilerplate
merger clause. That clause provides that each agreement “comprises the entire agreement
between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior
and contemporaneous agreements and understandings.” App. 100 ¶ 7 (emphasis added);
accord App. 34.
C. Contractual violations
After ten years, Volrath left Heartland to work for a direct competitor, performing the
same duties. He immediately began violating the manager agreement’s post-employment
conditions.
As Volrath admitted, he breached the confidentiality clause. Just hours after resigning,
he emailed confidential information to the competitor’s employees, some of whom were
his own children. He also testified that he had a list of Heartland’s prospective merchants
sent to his personal email account. And he solicited merchants on that list for the competitor. He admits that these emails contained confidential information. Yet he accessed the
information ten to fifteen times after resigning.
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He also solicited Heartland’s merchants. He persuaded a restaurant owner to switch
from Heartland to the competitor. And he contacted two other executives to steer their
business away from Heartland to his new employer. All three merchants had contractual or
business relationships with Heartland.
And Volrath allegedly tried to poach a Heartland employee. The employee testified that
Volrath described the competitor’s compensation plan and tried to recruit him. For all these
breaches, Heartland sued.
The District Court granted Heartland a preliminary injunction. Volrath now challenges
that order. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176
F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999).
Three standards govern our review of preliminary injunctions. We review legal conclusions de novo; findings of fact for clear error; and the ultimate decision to grant or deny
relief for abuse of discretion. K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d
99, 105 (3d Cir. 2013).
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
To get a preliminary injunction, Heartland had to show (1) a likelihood of success on
the merits; (2) a greater-than-even chance of irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction; (3) a favorable balance of equities; and (4) the public interest favoring the injunction. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017). Only the first two
prongs are in dispute. Because the District Court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, we
find no abuse of discretion.
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A. Heartland showed a likelihood of success on the merits
Volrath argues that the District Court erred by applying the non-solicitation clause from
the manager agreement rather than the one from the latest commission agreement. And
because he did not violate this commission agreement, he argues, the Court erred in finding
that Heartland was likely to succeed on the merits. But the manager agreement governs,
and he breached that agreement’s non-solicitation clause as well as its confidentiality
clause.
While Volrath does not dispute that the manager agreement’s confidentiality clause
governs, he does argue that its non-soliciation clause does not. He contends that, because
of the merger clause, the non-solicitation clause in the commission agreement trumps the
one in the manager agreement.
The District Court disagreed. It found that “the subject matter[s]” of the two agreements
were so different that the commission agreement’s non-solicitation clause only
supplemented that of the manager agreement rather than supplanting it. Heartland Payment
Sys., LLC v. Volrath, No. 2:17-5323-KSH-CLW, 2017 WL 6803519, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec.
31, 2017). The Court read the commission agreement narrowly to cover a single subject
matter: “the purchase of partial commissions related to merchant accounts.” Id. at *5. That
reading, however, is too limited. The “subject matter” in the merger clause refers to all
terms in the very contract that the clause integrates.
But the management agreement still controls. The manager agreement’s non-solicitation clause broadly governs three different subjects: (1) all Heartland’s merchants;
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(2) Heartland’s merchants that Volrath signed; and (3) Heartland’s employees. The commission agreement does not reach the first or third subjects; it forbids soliciting only Heartland merchants that compensated Volrath. Because there is no overlapping subject-matter
of soliciting all Heartland’s merchants and employees, the manager agreement continues
to govern those two subjects. And the Court correctly found “ample evidence” that Volrath
breached those two terms. Id. at *7.
Volrath does not dispute any of the other requirements for showing a likelihood of success on the merits. So the District Court correctly found for Heartland on this point.
B. Heartland showed that it was likely to suffer irreparable harm
Volrath next argues that the District Court applied the wrong legal standard to find a
likelihood of irreparable harm. He also argues that this finding was clearly erroneous. We
disagree on both counts.
1. The District Court applied the right legal standard. Volrath argues that the District
Court applied the wrong legal standard by requiring Heartland to show only an “imminent possibility” of irreparable harm. Appellant’s Br. 23. The correct standard requires
the moving party to show that it would “more likely than not . . . suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of preliminary relief.” Reilly, 858 F.3d at 179.
But the District Court used the right standard in its opinion: “Heartland must establish
. . . ‘that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.’ ” Heartland Payment Sys., 2017 WL 6803519, at *5 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)) (emphasis added). The opinion never mentioned an “imminent
possibility.” The Court used that phrase several times at oral argument, but it never held
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that was the standard. And we should not give every stray inquiry at oral argument the
same weight as a written opinion. See Dellew Corp. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1375, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2017). So the Court applied the right standard.
2. The District Court did not err in finding a likelihood of irreparable harm. Finally,
Volrath argues that the District Court clearly erred in finding that Heartland would likely
suffer irreparable harm. It did not err.
The Court again analyzed pertinent caselaw and relied on the record to grant the injunction. Rightly so: the risk of irreparable harm here was far from speculative. Volrath
had already breached the confidentiality and non-solicitation clauses many times. Those
breaches were immediate and serious, so the Court correctly applied “a strong presumption that he will breach again.” Heartland Payment Sys., 2017 WL 6803519, at *8. And
ample evidence showed that continued breaches could cause irreparable, incalculable
harm to Heartland, including loss of goodwill and damage to its reputation.
So the Court held that “[t]he evidence Heartland adduced establishes that the ‘concrete
risk’ and ‘changed loyalties’ about which Third Circuit cases have cautioned are in play.”
Id. That was not error, let alone clear error.
* * * * *
The manager agreement’s confidentiality and non-solicitation clauses govern, and
Volrath breached them. And the District Court thoroughly considered all the relevant cases
and facts in the record in finding that a preliminary injunction is warranted. It neither
clearly erred nor abused its discretion. So we will affirm.
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